



# Fragility Risk and Resilience Analysis Tool (FRRAT)

## Resource Pack

(Final June 2020)

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## Annex A Glossary

The terminology used in this note is harmonised with working definitions and conventions used by the OECD.

<b>Coping capacities</b>	Mechanisms that can help absorb, withstand, or prevent shocks and encompass the functioning of the state as well as informal mechanisms within a community or society.
<b>Fragility</b>	Fragility is the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.
<b>Resilience</b>	The ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty
<b>Resilience boosting</b>	To manage the impact of shocks and future issues of risk, change and uncertainty, by strengthening the capacity to absorb shocks, or adapting to reduce exposure to shocks, or transforming so that the shock no longer has an impact on the system
<b>Risk</b>	Risks are hazards, threats and vulnerabilities that are generated within a society or driven by external factors or events. If ignored, risks can turn into crises that societies do not have the capacity to manage, which can then reverse hard-won development gains and endanger the social and economic reforms that produced these gains
<b>Shock</b>	A sudden event with an important and often negative impact on the vulnerability of a system and its parts. Shocks represent significant negative (or positive) impacts on people's means of living and on the functioning of a state
<b>System</b>	A unit of society (e.g. individual, household, a group of people with common characteristics, community, nation), of ecology (e.g. a forest) or a physical entity (e.g. an urban infrastructure network).
<b>Adaptive Capacity</b>	Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust, modify or change its characteristics and actions to moderate potential future damage and to take advantage of opportunities, so that it can continue to function without major qualitative changes in function or structural identity. Examples of adaptive capacity include diversification of livelihoods, involvement of the private sector in delivering basic services, and introducing drought resistant seed.
<b>Absorptive capacity</b>	Absorptive capacity is the ability of a system to prepare for, mitigate or prevent negative impacts, using predetermined coping responses in order to preserve and restore essential basic structures and functions. This includes coping mechanisms used during periods of shock. Examples of absorptive capacity include early harvest, taking children out of school, and delaying debt repayments.
<b>Transformative capacity</b>	Transformative capacity is the ability to create a fundamentally new system so that the shock will no longer have any impact. This can be necessary when ecological, economic or social structures make the existing system untenable. Examples of transformative capacity include the introduction of conflict resolution mechanisms, urban planning measures, and actions to stamp out corruption. (OECD, 2014)

For further details: of see OECD on [fragility](#) and [risk and resilience](#)

## Annex B: Initial Danish HDP instrument-based country typology

### The instrument-based country typology was developed as follows:

**Step 1 criteria:** inclusion of all countries in which the PSF has engagements and inclusion of the 12 ODA priority countries.

**Step 2** differentiate between countries in which and the PSF is active, (Type A), countries that are ODA priority countries in which the PSF is engaged (Type B), and ODA countries without PSF engagements (Type C)

**Step 3:** inclusion within of a mark up of other instruments: protracted humanitarian priority countries; Regions of Origins, hard security, and civilian EU missions.

Denmark is engaged in **22 countries** through the PSF and primary Danish official development aid (ODA)<sup>1</sup> financing; 10 of these countries are also priorities for Denmark because of protracted humanitarian crises.

**The most comprehensive package of HDP instruments are used in Type B countries since these are priority countries with 5-year ODA engagements**

**The PSF** combines ODA and non-ODA (i.e. defence) national budget appropriations. Table 1 shows a breakdown of these 22 countries by financing instruments.

**The PSF** has engagements in 17 countries (columns A and B, in Table 1), of which 7 countries also are **ODA priority countries** (column B) (i.e. countries with current 'country programmes' The total number of ODA priority countries is 12 (columns B and C), out of which 7 countries are on the World Bank Group (WBG) most recent list of [Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#).

**Region of Origin (RoI)** support is ongoing or in the 2021 pipeline in 11 countries, '**hard military**' engagement in 5 countries (of which 3 countries in the Sahel including operation Barkhane, the others are Iraq and Afghanistan). **EU missions** are in countries 5 countries.

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<sup>1</sup> ODA is the key measure used in practically all aid targets and assessments of aid performance as agreed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

## Annex B: Initial Danish HDP instrument-based country typology

Table 1 Overview of ODA priority countries and countries with PSF engagements

Category		Prioritised protracted humanitarian crisis	Region of Origin instrument (1= yes)	PSF	ODA priority country	includes 'hard' military engagement (yes/no)		Bilateral military	EU mission	
<b>Type A</b>	<b>PSF only</b>									
EEU	Ukraine			1					1	EUAM (2014 civil)
EEU	Georgia			1					1	EUMM (2008 civil)
MENA	Iraq	1	1	1		1			1	EUAM (2017, civil)
MENA	Jordan		1	1						
MENA	Lebanon		1	1						
MENA	Syria	1	1	1						
Northern AFR	Libya	1		1					1	EUBAM (2013, civil)
Northern AFR	Tunesia			1						
SSA	Nigeria	1		1						
SSA	Ghana			1						
<b>Type B</b>	<b>ODA priority country and PSF</b>									
HoA	Ethiopia	1	(2021)	1	1					
HoA	Kenya		(2021)	1	1					
HoA	Somalia	1	(2021)	1	1				1	EUCAP (2012) (mil/civ)
Sahel	Burkina Faso		(2021)	1	1		1	Operation Barkhane		
Sahel	Mali	1	(2021)	1	1	1			1	EUCAP (2014)
Sahel	Niger		(2021)	1	1		1	Operation Barkhane	1	EUCAP (2012, civil)
SAR	Afghanistan	1	1	1	1	1				
<b>Type C</b>	<b>ODA priority country</b>									
EA	Myanmar	1								
MENA	Palestine	1								
SAR	Bangladesh									
SSA	Tanzania									
SSA	Uganda									
		10	5	15	12	3	2		5	

5

Note: The WBG uses three categories: 'high-intensity conflict' (red), 'medium-intensity conflict' (orange), and 'high-institutional and social fragility' (yellow). List of PSF countries based on [Denmark Peace and Stability Fund Annual Report 2018](#)

## Annex C Explanation of indicators by PESES dimension

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#### Political dimension

**Regime duration:** Both entrenched democracies and entrenched autocracies can be considered political stable in the sense that there is a low probability of regime breakdown. Transitions between regime types are a manifestation of political instability, which provide opportunities for political violence (Hegre et al 2001). The State Fragility Index uses regime durability as a measure of government effectiveness.

**Political terror:** State sanctioned violence against its citizens is a manifestation of a collapse of state legitimacy, which research has identified as one critical measure of fragility. Furthermore, state repression often forces opposition groups toward other means of expressing dissent including violence (Regan & Norton 2005). The GCRI and State Fragility Index use repression indicators in their calculations.

**Level of corruption:** Corruption can increase grievances and demands for political change which may be trigger political violence and social unrest. Corruption can also fuel greed which may provide motivations for opposition or rebel groups to try and capture the state through violent means, and for the state to use violent means to repress opposition (Le Billon 2003). High levels of corruption increase the risk of political violence and instability. The Fragile States Index, CIPF and USAID fragile states indicators all use some measure of corruption in their index calculations.

**Decentralized elections:** A highly centralized state suffers bigger consequences when political and sectarian turmoil occur than those states that have managed to decentralize power. Many highly centralized states mask a suppression of sectarian tensions, which, when they do erupt, can result in violence and conflict, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Centralization also may increase the probability of a military coup leading to further political instability (Taleb and Treverton 2015).

**Voice and accountability:** This index measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. By having a mechanism for channelling grievances and participating in the political process, if social instability does occur, there is an outlet for pressures that may otherwise boil over into violence.

**Freedom of the press:** A free press works as a check on political actors, corporations and civil society. It ensures that potential misinformation which may arise in situations of political

## Annex C Explanation of indicators by PESES dimension

instability are not allowed to perpetuate and blow out of proportion, thereby containing potential spill-overs to violence (van Belle 1997).

**Control of corruption:** Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests<sup>124</sup>. Controlling corruption reflects a state's capacity to deal with corrupt practices which are a risk to political fragility.

**Judicial and legislative constraints on executive power:** Conflicts are likelier to erupt in political systems which suffer from a lack of rule of law and checks and balances (Merkel 2012). By preventing action that oversteps legitimate boundaries of the state, checks and balances contain spill-over effects from political instability (Grant and Keohane 2005). The executive is less likely to be able to take control of the state, or to co-opt the military into performing actions which may lead to a cascading effect on violence.

### Economic dimension

**Resource rent dependence:** Resource dependence leads an economy to open to shocks in the global system as oil and mineral prices fluctuate. Resource dependence has also been found to increase the propensity for violence through greed and grievance mechanisms (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). The USAID fragile states indicators accounts for primary export dependence as a measure of economic effectiveness.

**Vulnerable employment and general government gross debt:** Poverty and economic decline put extra pressures on a state in terms of service delivery, and can cause or exacerbate frictions between those who "have" and those who "have not". People in situations of vulnerable employment tend to be hardest hit in economic crises, and countries facing high levels of sovereign debt tend to be most exposed during times of economic crises. In fragile economies especially, economic grievances can often result in protest, violence, and conflict (Collier 2006).

**Youth not in education, employment or education (NEET):** When youth, especially young men, are not engaged in productive activity such as employment, education or training, they may pose a threat to social stability and conflict. Youth are more likely to be recruited as fighters and take up arms when their expected incomes from the formal labour market or agriculture are less than their expected incomes from fighting (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Moreover, low levels of secondary education, again particularly in males, is strongly correlated with the outbreak of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

**Aid dependency:** Aid dependency can increase a country's risk of conflict: severe aid shocks (decreases in aid) have been found to alter the domestic balance of power and induce violence (Nielsen et al. 2011).

**GDP growth rate:** An economy growing strongly is less likely to see economic tensions leading to violent conflict. Economies that go through periods of negative growth and growth shocks have an increased likelihood of conflict (Miguel et al 2004). High rates of economic growth that result in increased economic inequality tends to exacerbate underlying tensions and may lead to an increased likelihood of conflict over the distribution of resources.

## Annex C Explanation of indicators by PESES dimension

**Education:** Low levels of education can lead to dependence on low-skilled work as a means of employment, which tends to be the most vulnerable employment in an economy. High levels of education combined with low levels of economic opportunity, however is also a dangerous mix, acting as a catalyst for violent conflict.

**Regulatory quality:** Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. If governments have good regulatory quality, any spill-over effects into protest or violence from economic shocks are more easily contained (Maarek et al 2012).

**Remoteness:** Location is relevant for exposure and resilience to economic shocks. Countries situated far from major world markets face a series of structural handicaps, such as high transportation costs and isolation, which render them less able to respond to shocks in an effective way. These countries have greater difficulty in diversifying their economies, even in the current era of globalization and the Internet.

Remoteness does not only constitute a potential impediment to exports, but it also increases the costs of acquiring necessary imports and enhances, thus, the vulnerability to price shocks on global markets as well as to domestic shocks (including, e.g., natural disasters). Remoteness is a structural obstacle to trade and growth and is particularly binding in the case of many lower income small island developing States (SIDS) and landlocked developing countries. Landlocked countries, facing higher barriers to trade, often confront relatively higher transport costs for a given distance.

**Food security:** Food security is considered a fundamental indicator of a country's resilience to both environmental and economic shocks. At the same time, food insecurity has been identified as a link between social and economic tensions and the spill-over into violence and conflict: thus, food security can be considered a buffer between tension and violence (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). The Fragile States Index and the CFP use measures of food insecurity in their calculations

### Societal dimension

**GINI coefficient:** Although the causal relationship between vertical inequality and conflict is debated (Stewart 1998), high levels of income inequality can cause or exacerbate underlying social tensions, as well as overall levels of poverty in the general population.

**Gender inequality:** Research has found that countries characterized by gender inequality are more likely to be involved in interstate disputes and more likely to rely on violence to settle those disputes. It has also been found that high levels of gender inequality may lead to a greater propensity for intrastate conflict (Caprioli 2005).

**Horizontal inequality:** Horizontal inequalities within a society may impact social cohesion. Kaplan (2008, 2009, 2012) and others argue that state fragility is caused not only by weak institutions, but also by a lack of social cohesion which leads to the erosion of intergroup trust and an increased risk of conflict (Marc, Willman, Aslam, Rebosio, with Balasuriya, 2013). Many post-conflict development programs now have one component focused on rebuilding social cohesion to reduce the likelihood of relapse into conflict.

## Annex C Explanation of indicators by PESES dimension

**Uprooted people:** The presence of refugees and displaced populations can increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin countries. A majority of refugees never directly engage in violence but refugee flows facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict, and also alter the ethnic composition of the state, and they can also exacerbate economic competition (Salehayn and Gleditsch 2005). Some measure of refugee burden on a host country are also used in GCRI, INFORM, CIFP indexes.

**Urban growth rate (%):** Urbanization and the speed of urbanization have a positive relationship with crime rates (Muggah 2014). Urbanization has also been found to have a direct effect on levels of political protest, which heighten the risk of political conflict (Auvinen 1997). The CIFP and USAID Fragile States indicators both use some measure of urbanization.

**Access to justice:** This indicator measures whether citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice. If citizens have mechanisms to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner using the legal system, this channels grievances induced by social risk factors away from violent action and conflict, containing the effects of any realised risks.

**Voice and accountability:** This index measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. By having a mechanism for channelling grievances and participating in the political process, if social instability does occur, there is an outlet for pressures that may otherwise boil over into violence.

**Core civil society index:** As per the environmental dimension.

### Environmental dimension

**Natural disaster risk:** The INFORM natural disasters index captures the risk of some commonly occurring natural disasters, which in turn are a measure of environmental risk. The CIFP also uses a disaster risk measure for environmental fragility.

**Environmental health:** Environmental health measures the protection of human health from environmental harm. The component indicators measure air and water quality, pollution levels and safe sanitation.

**Prevalence of infectious diseases:** Research suggests that the prevalence of infectious diseases in a country can increase the risk of violent conflict outbreak. Infectious diseases can lead to the emergence of ethnocentric cultural norms, which coupled with resource competition among ethnic groups can lead to an increased frequency of civil wars (Letendre et al 2010).

**Government effectiveness:** Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.



## Annex C Explanation of indicators by PESES dimension

**Core civil society index:** This indicator attempts to capture the notion of social capital, which is defined as “the set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society’s institutional arrangements which enables its members to achieve their individual and community objectives”. Social capital buffers the risk of social instability spilling over into social violence and conflict by allowing groups to overcome differences and solve collective action problems (Lederman et al 2000).

**Food security:** As per the economic dimension.

### Security dimension

**Homicide rate:** High homicide rates are associated with high risks to security of persons within a country and reflects a diminished capacity of government to perform its duties to protect people within its borders.

**Level of violent criminal activity:** Violent criminal activity may undermine a state's ability to exercise its monopoly on violence and increase risks to public security of persons and property (Tilly, 1985). Furthermore, organized crime undermines a state’s capacity and legitimacy: by undermining the ability to provide public goods and services and making corruption the norm (van Dijk, 2007). When a state’s capacity and legitimacy are eroded, the potential for an outbreak of violent conflict either internally, or externally through transnational organized criminal activities, increase.

**Deaths by non-state actors per capita:** Armed non-state actors undermine the state’s monopoly on the use of force and are drivers of security fragility (Schnekener 2006).

**Impact of terrorism:** Terrorism is intrinsically linked to a country’s safety and security environment. In the last 25 years, 88 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Terrorist attacks can cause already unstable situations to fall further into the precipice of violence.

**Battle related deaths per capita:** High levels of battle related deaths indicate high security fragility and can contribute to further conflict and instability.

**Police officers per 100,000 and armed security officers per 100,000:** A state’s security apparatus ensures monopoly over violence and control over territory, as well as public safety. With adequate police and security personnel, a state that is experiencing security instability will be able to respond quickly and in a way that ensures further cascading effects – for example full scale civil war – are less likely to break out.

**Rule of law:** Good and strong institutions are a fundamental pillar for a strong state. The rule of law provides a means of addressing grievances through means other than violence and conflict. In ethnically heterogeneous societies in particular, it has been found that strong rule of law is associated with enduring peace (Easterly 2000).

**Control over territory:** States that control their territory, however fragile the security situation has become, are resilient to total state collapse and failure (Rotberg 2002).

## **Annex C Explanation of indicators by PESES dimension**

**Formal security alliances:** Countries that are members of formal security alliances are more resilient to conflicts spilling over from neighbouring countries and transnational violence and crime in general.

**Global conflict risk index:** The GCRI is an index of the statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years based on 25 quantitative indicators from open sources.<sup>128</sup> The GCRI measures this with respect to five risk domains: political, social cohesion & public security, conflict prevalence, geography & environment, and economy. Twenty-two indicators are used to measure the risk of conflict in the near future as well as the intensity of ongoing conflict for 137 countries, going back to 1989<sup>129</sup>. Although the index uses the same domains as the SFR framework, the index is one step removed from a measure of fragility in that it looks at risk but not explicitly at coping capacity.

**Government effectiveness:** As per the environmental dimension.

# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Afghanistan

### How to read these radar diagrams:

All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Afghanistan relative to the Average Fragile Context




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Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Afghanistan relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Afghanistan relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Afghanistan relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Afghanistan relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Burkina Faso

### How to read these radar diagrams:


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Source: OECD/DAC

### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Burkina Faso relative to the Average Fragile Context




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Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Burkina Faso relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Burkina Faso relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Burkina Faso relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Burkina Faso relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Bangladesh

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
### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Bangladesh relative to the Average Fragile Context




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
### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Bangladesh relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Bangladesh relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Bangladesh relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Ethiopia

### How to read these radar diagrams:


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
### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Ethiopia relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

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### Societal

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
### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Ethiopia relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Ethiopia relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Kenya

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
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
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
### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Kenya relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Kenya relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Kenya relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Myanmar

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
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Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Myanmar relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Myanmar relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Myanmar relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Myanmar relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Myanmar relative to the Average Fragile Context





# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Mali

### How to read these radar diagrams:


All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Mali relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Mali relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Mali relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Mali relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Mali relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Niger

### How to read these radar diagrams:

All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Niger relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Niger relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Niger relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Niger relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Niger relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Somalia

### How to read these radar diagrams:


All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Somalia relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Somalia relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Somalia relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Somalia relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Somalia relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Tanzania

### How to read these radar diagrams:


All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Tanzania relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Tanzania relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Tanzania relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Tanzania relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Tanzania relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## Uganda

### How to read these radar diagrams:


All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of Uganda relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of Uganda relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of Uganda relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of Uganda relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of Uganda relative to the Average Fragile Context



# Annex D Country PESES charts

## West Bank and Gaza (Palestine)

### How to read these radar diagrams:


All indicators are facing the same direction – higher values mean worse performance, e.g., greater risks or lower coping capacities.

Risk indicators are labeled as (R), while coping capacity indicators are labeled as (C). All values are re-scaled from 0 to 100 to assist interpretation.

Source: OECD/DAC


### Political

Fragility in the Political Dimension of West Bank and Gaza Strip relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Economic

Fragility in the Economic Dimension of West Bank and Gaza Strip relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Societal

Fragility in the Societal Dimension of West Bank and Gaza Strip relative to the Average Fragile Context




### Environmental

Fragility in the Environmental Dimension of West Bank and Gaza Strip relative to the Average Fragile Context



### Security

Fragility in the Security Dimension of West Bank and Gaza Strip relative to the Average Fragile Context



## Annex E: Kenya sample of the multi-dimensional fragility risk analysis matrix

Note: this is a sample only prepared for illustration purpose only

### PESES Multi-dimensional fragility risk analysis matrix: Kenya sample

Fragility dimension	Derived or multiplier effects/risk to resilience in other dimensions				
	Political	Economic	Societal	Environmental	Security
<b>Political</b>	<p>High negative score on factionalized elites, group grievances &amp; low state legitimacy (FFPI))</p> <p>Misuse by politicians of state institutions and resources for campaigning,</p> <p>Political entrepreneurs use ethnic affiliation and manipulate ethnic grievances as the basis for political mobilization to gain power and control over resources.</p> <p>Fiscal and political devolution generate intra-ethnic competition at the county level. marginalization is happening based on clans and sub-tribes.</p> <p>Diminishing role of the CSO sector, CSO deeply</p>		<p>Public participation constrained by interplay of ethnicity and struggles over executive power</p> <p>The politicization of ethnicity at the national level hinders effective representation of different segments of Kenya's diverse population, limits voter choice, and impedes meaningful policy debates.</p> <p>CSOs unable to realize its potential and mobilize mass support to address the challenges facing the country</p>		<p>Election violence. Politicians will recruit and arm young men to disrupt political competitor's rallies; attack rival communities; commit other communal violence such as cattle rustling</p> <p>Exclusion of youth from political participation leave them vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism; make them an easy target to be manipulated as perpetrators of conflicts or civil disorders as well as to be involved in violent crime.</p> <p>The politicization of the counterterrorism response and the scapegoating of certain ethnic and religious groups have played into Al-Shabaab's hands</p>

**Annex E: Kenya sample of the multi-dimensional fragility risk analysis matrix**

	Derived or multiplier effects/risk to resilience in other dimensions				
Fragility dimension	Political	Economic	Societal	Environmental	Security
	dived, less influence on political agenda				
<b>Economic</b>		<p>Kenya’s growth not inclusive, leaving up to 36.1% of Kenyans still living in poverty (KNBS 2018) and out of those, 29% living in extreme poverty (World Poverty Clock Report, 2018)</p> <p>GDP growth driven mainly by public infrastructure investments, not sustainable given build-up of deficits and debt, crowd out private investments, constraints in enabling environment.</p> <p>Growing income inequalities on average, less than 20% of the population controls more than 80% of the wealth in the major cities; situation being worst in rural areas.</p>			
<b>Societal</b>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Demographic development</li> <li>-</li> </ul>		
<b>Environmental</b>		Environmental degradation and Climate Change remain a real and present threat to	Resource scarcity becomes a root cause of conflict where groups	climate change is expected to bring about increased vulnerability –	Climate change and environmental degradation are becoming principal contributors to conflict and



## Annex E: Kenya sample of the multi-dimensional fragility risk analysis matrix

Fragility dimension	Derived or multiplier effects/risk to resilience in other dimensions				
	Political	Economic	Societal	Environmental	Security
		<p>nature-based economies and Kenya, with over 42% Kenya's GDP generated from natural resource sectors and over 70% of livelihoods and employment in Kenya dependent on NR sectors</p> <p>The economic cost of floods and droughts is estimated to create a long-term fiscal liability equivalent to 2%-2.8% of GDP each year.</p> <p>The economic impacts of floods are severe; in 2018, rain and flooding wiped out resources worth billions of shillings.</p> <p>Droughts have had the greatest economic impact – on average, a 0.6 percentage point decline in GDP growth is observed in Kenya in years of poor rains. The agriculture sector</p> <p>Water and associated social and economic sectors are highly susceptible to changing climate patterns and extreme events. grew by 1.6% in 2017, compared to 4.7% in 2016,</p>	<p>pursue zero-sum approaches to resource use and management</p> <p>Human activities pose the greatest threat through unsustainable land management practices such as destruction of natural vegetation, over-cultivation, over grazing and deforestation.</p> <p>land ownership continues to remain in the hands of the older generation and the threat of climate change and an increasing aging farming population does fundamentally impact on the prospects of the future of agriculture in Kenya</p> <p>Population and income growth and the resulting increase in demand has intensified water demand and stretched water supplies for domestic and production</p>	<p>especially to NR sectors, arising from sea-level rise, greater rainfall variability, higher temperature, and decreased freshwater availability (Turral et al. 2011)</p> <p>Cyclical droughts – intensified and prolonged by climate change and environmental degradation</p> <p>Kenya's water resources are unevenly distributed and scarce, on average less than 500m<sup>3</sup> per capita of renewable freshwater supplies in 2017, and unevenly distributed. The decline is projected to 235 m<sup>3</sup> by 2025.</p> <p>Increasing pollution degrades freshwater and climate change is poised to shift water availability patterns, altering water supplies and intensifying floods and drought</p>	<p>instability in Kenya. Particularly Dadaab and Kakuma (reference to Amaya 2018 study by Danida), which then also has humanitarian consequences</p>

**Annex E: Kenya sample of the multi-dimensional fragility risk analysis matrix**

	Derived or multiplier effects/risk to resilience in other dimensions				
Fragility dimension	Political	Economic	Societal	Environmental	Security
		because drought suppressed production of crops and adversely affected livestock production.			
<b>Security</b>	corruption has severely compromised the security sector, while impunity and limited access to justice legitimize violence and lead to revenge attacks.		Discrimination and marginalization: certain groups and areas have faced long-term discrimination and marginalization, which has been exploited by violent extremists		<p>The proliferation of small arms: this provides more opportunities for violence and wider insecurity. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are a major indicator of the</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many Kenyans view the police as products of a colonial past, structured as predatory, regime-serving, command and control organizations (a 'police force' rather than a 'police service' potentiality for armed conflict (especially in arid and semi arid areas). A subsequent communal arms race only accelerates the ascent to violence.</li> </ul> <p>The organization and conscription of especially the youth into organized gangs, warriors and/or militias institutionalizes and sustains the culture of violence at the communal level both in urban and rural areas.</p> <p>Al-Shabaab's exploitation of local politics: recently Al-Shabaab's violence has interwoven with local Kenyan violence, as Al-Shabaab has used social and economic grievances to deepen political divides and further its own cause.</p>

## Annex F Application of the FRRAT and preparation of Country Strategic Frameworks

Step 1: Start-up 1-2 months		Step 2: Analysis and first draft 3-4 months		Step 3 - Presentation and approval 5-7 months		Step 4 - Formulation of engagement portfolio 8-11 months	
1	set-up CTF	1	public consultations /DK and in-country)	1	Programme Committee	1	formulation mission(s)
2	Agree PAP	2	1-pager context (Embassy)	2	Finalise CSF	2	pre-appraisal
3	Prepare country tailored FRRAT	3	FRRAT informs strategic questions	3	CSF made public	3	CTF meeting on pre-appraisal
4	collect studies and analysis	4	Draft outline CSF (Embassy)	4	Council for Development Policy	4	
5	Establish overview of DK instruments	5	Draft CSF (Embassy & CSF)	5	Submission to Minister(s)	5	
6	FRRAT guidance on sources						
7	Internal strategic workshop						
8	FRRAT informs strategic discussions						

Fragility Risk and Resilience Analysis /1	A	Generic FRRAT provides basis for preparations of country tailored (CT-FRRAT) and informs strategic discussion & use of instruments for HDP Nexus response	C	FRRAT informs (a) context analysis in CSF main document, and (b) is reflected in more detail in AMG Annex 1 Context Analysis and Annex 5	D	FRRAT promotes considerations and strategic decision on contextual fragility risk and resilience	F	FRRAT refined for prioritised sectors, territorial and thematic engagements
	B	provides latest fragility dimension radar graphs based on OECD State of Fragility			E	FRRAT reflected in AMG Annex 1 - context analysis and updated AMG Annex 5 Risk Management Matrix		