**Contextual risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Background to assessment** |
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**Programmatic risks** (for country programmes/regional programmes filled out for each thematic programme)

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Background to assessment** |
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**Institutional risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Background to assessment** |
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Example:

Contextual risks

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response if applicable** | **Background to assessment** |
| Armed conflict spreads to larger parts of the country | Likely | Major | Programme activities to be limited to safe areas where feasible; some activities to be suspended. | Development of security situation is negative at present, with potentially serious implications for programme activities. No preventive measures are available to DK.  |
| Wide-spread loss of trust in authorities and democratic institutions due to corruption and misuse becoming more frequent and visible following the decentralisation reform. | Likely | Major | Dialogue with relevant central authorities on preventive measures (training of LG councillors and staff; intensified supervision, audit) | Decentralisation increases availability of public funds to District authorities, with central controls probably remaining weak.  |

Programmatic risks

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Background to assessment** |
| Water sector: The frequency of corruption increases in the sector after decentralisation  | Likely | Major | Min. of Water to be urged to intensify supervision of works at District level. Possibly introduction of joint-donor value for money studies. | Districts’ capacity and quality of governance will only increase gradually. Procurement processes and implementation may suffer. Possibilities of short-term preventive measures are limited.  |
| NGO funding facility: The space available to civil society for activism and advocacy is substantially reduced | Likely | Major | Closer coordination among donors and intensified joint pressure on the authorities to respect the rights of the civil society;  | Present political trends are worrying; shrinking CSO space would seriously reduce scope for impact. Limited possibility for donors to influence the development since reduction of CSO support would be counterproductive. |

Institutional risks

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Background to assessment** |
| Denmark gets associated with major corruption scandal in one of the sectors of the programme. | Likely | Minor | Suspension of funding during investigation; explanation to DK constituency of importance of working with national system; possibly introduction of further controls. | The bulk of our support is close to fully integrated in the national systems, known to be imperfect. Impact may be more or less serious depending on duration of suspension and need for extra control measures.  |